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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is an original attempt to use the Coase Theorem 
formulated in Coase (1959) to evaluate market efficiency in franchised 
bus transit services in Hong Kong. It identifies three determinants of 
service efficiency, namely ownership structure, operational scale and 
finally competition comes from the Mass Transit Railway. The 
methodologies used were those found in works of leading transport 
analysts, including those by Filippini and Prioni (2003); Cowie and 
Asenova (1999); Shaw-Er et al. (2005). 
 
The history of bus franchise in Hong Kong is carefully reviewed 
so as to provide a proper institutional context for the analysis of market 
efficiency. The performance of three current franchise bus companies, 
namely Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited (KMB), Citybus 
Limited (CTB) and New World First Bus Services Limited (NWFB), and 
one former franchised bus company, namely China Motor Bus Company 
Limited (CMB), is examined. The key empirical findings of this 
dissertation are: 
(a) the involvement of a property developer in the ownership structure 
of a bus company may lead to an increase in bus fare; 
xi 
(b) three franchised bus companies, i.e., KMB, NWFB and CMB, in 
Hong Kong enjoy economies of scale; and 
(c) the Mass Transit Railway (MTR), as the biggest competitor of 
buses, has brought down the average bus fare. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The paper “The Federal Communications Commission” written 
by Coase in 1959 is on the reading list of my year 3 BSc (Surveying) 
study for the subject “Land and Construction Economics III”. The 
lecturer discussed various kinds of market failures with the students, such 
as the externalities and public goods. The issue on monopolies was 
covered by the article “The Federal Communications Commission”, in 
which Coase (1959) discussed the question of property rights of the ether. 
At that time, any monopolistic operation of a radio station in the United 
States was restricted by the Federal Communications Commission, 
despite the Law did not say so. (Coase, 1959) Coase’s discussion on the 
property rights of the ether and criticism on the Federal Communications 
Commission lead to similar questions on transportation: who actually 
owns the public roads and how does the government regulate the public 
transit services more efficiently? 
 
Background 
 
As Coase (1959) has criticized in his study of the political 
economy of broadcasting, government intervention is undesirable and 
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inefficient in the allocation of resource in relating to radio waves in the 
ether. It was the case that any broadcasting station had to obtain a license 
from the Federal Communications Commission before it could operate in 
the United States. This practice was indeed inefficient as the US 
Government used it as a means of controlling the content of the broadcast 
messages. The fundamental conceptual question is who actually owns the 
ether, which can be considered as a common good. (Coase, 1959) A 
similar question can be asked in the case of a bus franchise: who owns the 
public roads?  
 
The history of government franchising bus transit services in 
Hong Kong began in 1933. The original incentive was to enhance the 
government revenue at that time. (Finances Report, 1933: A (1) 2) Since 
then, the government has been playing an active role in governing bus 
transit services. It did not allow China Motor Bus Company (CMB) from 
obtaining a new franchise in 1998, thus ending a 65-years period of 
monopoly of bus services mainly on Hong Kong Island. CMB’s business 
was taken over by two other companies with a property development 
background: both companies are new members of the NWS Holdings 
Limited, a subsidiary of New World Development Limited. Is the market 
maintaining high efficiency under this government franchise mechanism? 
The answer is an empirical question according to the corollary of the 
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Coase Theorem (Lai and Hung, 2008; Lai et al., 2008). In the real world, 
where transaction cost is always positive and property rights, i.e., the 
right of the public roads, are not clearly defined, the way rights and 
liabilities are assigned will affect resource allocation. (Lai, 2007) For 
example, the operation costs and incentives to research and development 
might change in a private enterprise when there is a change in its 
ownership structure. This dissertation concentrates on the market 
efficiency in the franchised bus transit services in Hong Kong. 
 
Objectives 
 
The objectives of this dissertation are threefold.  
(a) First of all, to test whether the involvement of a property developer in 
a bus transit company in Hong Kong would lead to an improvement of 
service efficiency. 
(b) Secondly, identify the determinants of the market efficiency, i.e. the 
economies of scale and competition, of bus transit services in Hong Kong.  
(c) Finally, identify the directions for future study on the monopoly 
power of bus companies in Hong Kong. 
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Organization 
 
This dissertation has five chapters. Chapter One is the 
introduction, which includes the background to, objectives and 
organization of this dissertation.  
 
Chapter Two is a literature review, which includes the revision of 
theoretical grounds of justifying the concept of government franchise, the 
study of various methodologies applied by different transport analysts in 
recent times, and a historical review of the beginning and development of 
the bus franchises in Hong Kong since 1933.  
 
Chapter Three presents the hypotheses and methodologies. 
Chapter Four examines the empirical findings from the models set in the 
previous section and discusses the implications of the results.  
 
Finally, Chapter Five is the conclusion, which discusses 
limitations of this research and further studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE AND HONG KONG 
HISTORICAL REVIEW 
 
This chapter includes two major parts. The first one is a literature 
review on the Coase Theorem and methodologies applied to 
transportation analysis. The second part is a Hong Kong historical review 
on the origin and development of the franchised bus services.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the Coase Theorem identified by 
Stigler in 1987 based on Coase’s (1960) “The Problem of Social Cost” 
shares some common ideas with Coase’s another work, “The Federal 
Communications Commission” (Coase, 1959). Some theoretical issues in 
the latter paper are discussed in this dissertation in order to shed light on 
the current bus franchise practice in Hong Kong. At the same time, the 
corollary of the Coase theorem (Lai, 1994; Lai and Hung, 2008; Lai et al., 
2008) may also help to better relate the theory together with the practice 
as the corollary is applied in a real situation. 
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Theoretical Issues Found in Coase’s  
“The Federal Communications Commission” (1959) 
 
Coase (1959)’s idea about right of the ether is the theoretical 
foundation for this dissertation. The fundamental conceptual question 
raised in Coase (1959) is who owns the ether, which can be considered as 
a common good. Applying the concept to transportation, the question 
becomes: who owns the public roads?  
 
The establishment of the Federal Communications Commission 
was based on an Act passed in the year 1927. Before its establishment, 
there were some proposals in the United States designed for government 
control of the operation of the radio industry as a whole in the beginning 
of last century.  
The initial concern is the safety issue as mischievous and 
irresponsible operators always sent out false signals to ships 
off shore. Therefore a bill was introduced in 1910, 
stipulating that anyone operating a radio station must have a 
license issued by the Secretary of Commerce. There was also 
a recommendation that the Secretary of Commerce should 
assign the allocation of wave bands by various classes of 
service instead of using a pricing mechanism. However two 
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years later, a substitute bill was introduced and became law 
to limit the discretionary power of the Secretary. The main 
difference between these two bills was that the President was 
also given with a power to make regulations. A court case in 
1921 brought the attention to the discretionary power of the 
Secretary of Commerce. In the case, a telegraph company, 
the Intercity Radio Company, could not get its license 
renewed because that its use of any available wave length 
would interfere with the signals of other stations. The court 
decision was that the Secretary of Commerce had no 
discretion to refuse a license. The reason of the court 
decision was that there was no limitations mentioned in the 
Act on the power of station, hours of operation, and the wave 
length would be used. In addition, the Secretary had no 
control over the number of stations that could be established. 
However, the government passed a joint resolution providing 
that no license should be granted for more than ninety days 
for a broadcasting station or for more than two years for any 
other type of station in afraid of licensees establishing 
property rights in frequencies in 1926. In February 1927, the 
regulation of the radio industry finally became law, based on 
which the Federal Radio Commission was established. In 
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other words, the Federal Communications Commission was 
established because of the fear that “private persons and 
organizations might establish property rights in frequencies 
without making any payment for appropriating what was 
called the last of the public domain. (Coase, 1959: 2-7, italics 
author’s) 
 
In Coase’s view, there were at least two pitfalls for the radio 
industry to be controlled by the Federal Communications Commission. 
Both lead to inefficient resource allocation. 
The first one comes from the misunderstanding that a 
resource used in broadcasting is limited in amount and 
scarce especially compared with other resources, for instance 
newspapers. The government once declared that the ether 
and the use thereof is the inalienable possession of the people 
of the United State. This misunderstanding had lead to an 
inefficient resource allocation in two aspects. For one thing, 
the Commission was authorized to issue a license if the 
public interest, necessity or convenience would be served by 
so doing. Once the license was granted, it could not be 
transferred to anyone else without the approval of the 
Commission. This kind of practice is obvious a contradictory 
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to the concept of laissez-faire, which advocates the minimum 
government interventions. For the other thing, although the 
Federal Communication Commission was not bound by the 
antitrust laws, it still might refuse an application for a 
license because of the monopolistic practices of the applicant. 
This kind of refusal killed the possibility of operating at a 
more efficient level by a monopoly in the broadcasting 
industry. This possibility had been raised by Mr. Daniels, 
who judged that there are only two methods of operating the 
wireless: either by the government or for it to license one 
corporation. Radio, by virtue of the interferences, is a 
natural monopoly. Coase also used an analogy to illustrate a 
similar point: regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its 
development as traffic control was to the development of the 
automobile. There is a fixed natural limitation upon the 
number of stations that can operate without interfering with 
one another. (Coase, 1959: 6-7, 20, italics author’s) 
The second misunderstanding is that since broadcasters are 
making use of public property, the government has a right to 
see that such public resources are used “in the public 
interest”. The argument made by the government resulted in 
its intervention on the program content of the radio station 
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and thus an efficiency loss to the society. When the time 
comes for renewal of the license, which at the present time is 
every three years, the past programming of the station is 
reviewed. However, there should be no reason why there 
should not be private property in frequencies and thus no 
limitations on the program content. If the criterion of “public 
interest” were limited to such matters, how could the 
Commission choose between two applicants for the same 
facilities, each of whom is financially and technically 
qualified to operate a station? Coase himself answered that 
the question of who, out of the many claimants, should be 
allowed to use the scarce resource is usually done in the 
American economic system is to employ the price 
mechanism without the need for government regulation. The 
answer in fact indicated back to the first misunderstanding 
on the property right, as he further pointed out that the real 
cause of the trouble was that no property rights were created 
in these scarce frequencies. (Coase, 1959: 13-14, italics 
author’s) 
 
The reasons about pitfalls of the controls over the radio industry 
in the United States actually justified the bus franchise in Hong Kong. As 
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Coase said, “a private-enterprise system cannot function properly unless 
property rights are created in resources, and, when this is done, someone 
wishing to use a resource has to pay the owner to obtain it.” (Coase, 1959: 
14) 
 
First of all, Coase’s argument of the institutional arrangements of 
property rights of the frequency can be considered as a justification for 
the idea of a franchise, provided that it is obtained by contract (Lai, 1994). 
A bus franchise from the government can be considered as an initial 
property right determined by contract and their subsequent 
rearrangements are also left to the market. 
It is not clear that the solution in which there is no 
interference is necessarily preferable. When large numbers 
of people are involved, the argument for the institution of 
property rights is weakened and that for general regulations 
becomes stronger. In these circumstances it may be 
preferable to impose special regulations. It should not be 
thought that, because some right are determined by 
regulation, there cannot be others which can be modified by 
contract. Once the rights of potential users have been 
determined initially, the rearrangement of rights could be 
left to the market. It is not necessary to abolish the institution 
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of private property in order to control the growth of 
monopolies. It can be solved by delimiting the rights which 
various persons possess. How far this delimitation of rights 
should come about as a result of a strict regulation and how 
far as a result of transactions on the market is a question 
that can be answered only on the basis of practical 
experience. But there is good reason to believe that the 
present system, which relies exclusively on regulation and in 
which private property and the pricing system play no part, is 
not the best solution. (Coase, 1959: pp. 14-15, italics 
author’s) 
 
Furthermore, there is often (but not always) a trade off between 
market efficiency and social equity. A monopolistic market does not 
necessarily involve government interventions in the sense that the 
government actually runs the monopoly (Lai and Yu, 2003). For one 
thing, the monopoly would not get the chance to fully exploit its 
consumers’ surplus because of the potential competitor who might enter 
to the market. For the other thing, the monopoly would encounter a loss if 
it adopts “marginal pricing” by price discrimination as it typically 
produces at decreasing cost (Lai and Yu, 2003: 226-228; Lai, Davies and 
Lorne, 2008a: 410-411; 2008b: 556-557). However, if it can realize 
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internal cross-subsidy, market efficiency can be improved at a lower 
transaction cost. Coase (1959: 19) mentioned the “distribution of funds”, 
which employs a similar mechanism as the cross-subsidy. 
The operation of a market is not itself costless. Insofar as the 
ability to pay for frequencies or channels depends on the 
distribution of funds, it is the distribution not between 
persons but between firms which is relevant. And here the 
ethical problem does not arise. All that matters is whether 
the distribution of funds contributes to efficiency, and there is 
every reason to suppose that, broadly speaking, it does. 
(Coase, 1959: 18-19, italics author’s) 
 
Finally, Coase’s criticism of the Federal Communications 
Commission indeed reveals the possibility of efficiency gain from a 
government franchise: 
What needs to be emphasized is that the problem, so far as 
the Federal Communications Commission is concerned, 
largely arises because of a failure to charge for the rights 
granted. This provision of a valuable resource without charge 
naturally raises the income of station operators above what it 
would have been in competitive conditions. The frequency is 
public property, and the grant of a license gives no rights of 
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any sort in that frequency. However, the Commission almost 
always approves such negotiated transfers, and, when these 
take place, there can be little doubt that often a great part of 
the purchase price is in fact payment for obtaining the use of 
the frequency. There is no analytical difference between the 
right to use a resource without direct harm to others and the 
right to conduct operations in such a way as to produce direct 
harms to others. (Coase, 1959: 22, 26, italics author’s) 
 
According to the corollary of the Coase Theorem (Lai, 1994; Lai 
and Hung, 2008; Lai et al., 2008), the way rights and liabilities are 
assigned, i.e., which company obtains the bus franchise from the 
government, does influence the resource allocation of the market, i.e., the 
market efficiency. After obtaining initial franchises from the government, 
private companies own the right to use the public roads and the right to 
provide bus transit services to the public. According to Coase’s (1959) 
idea, if these private companies can freely reallocate these rights after it 
obtained from the government, the market efficiency can be ensured. 
Nevertheless, the government has been playing an active role in governing 
bus transit services since the first franchise was granted. This can be 
considered as an intervention that can reduce market efficiency. Whether 
this is so is an empirical question. 
15 
Methodologies in Transport Analysis 
 
There is a huge literature on the ownership structures of bus 
services and their impact on services efficiency, in the UK, the US, 
Europe and Asia.  
 
Different transportation analysts have different opinions on the 
question of economies of scale. An important work is that by Filippini 
and Prioni (2003) about bus service provision in Switzerland. In their 
research, the focus is on the ownership structures of bus transit companies 
and their economies of scales. They concluded that medium-sized bus 
companies out of all 34 bus operators under study managed to operate at 
a slight return to scale (Filippini and Prioni, 2003: 689-690). Some 
studies elsewhere indicated similar results (Farsi et al., 2007; Farsi et al., 
2006; Shaw-Er et al., 2005; Fraquelli et al., 2004; Cambini and Filippini, 
2003; Bhattacharyya et al., 1995; Viton, 1993; Shleifer, 1985), whereas 
others indicated the opposite (Cowie, 2002; Cowie and Asenova, 1999; 
Chapin and Schmidt, 1999; Simpson, 1996; White, 1995; Berechman and 
Giuliano, 1985).  
 
In the literature on the ownership structure of bus services and its 
impact to services efficiency, one major UK topic is the British Transport 
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Act of 1985. The Transport Act 1985 introduced three main changes to 
the UK bus services: deregulation, involving the removal of barriers to 
providing local bus services; the transfer to the private sector of publicly-
owned bus companies; and competitive tendering whereby local 
authorities were given powers to fund socially necessary but unprofitable 
services by tendering routes to bus companies. (Simpson, 1996)  
 
It was found that the costs per bus-kilometer had fallen 
significantly primarily because of increased labor productivity after the 
deregulation of local bus services under the Transport Act 1985 (White, 
1995). White (1995) further argued that much competition took the form 
of expanding bus-kilometers run, rather than in price reduction. 
Therefore, while the public expenditure had fallen substantially, the bus 
companies had remained profitable. White thus concluded that increase 
interest in the role public transport could benefit buses substantially 
(White, 1995: 185). These UK findings can be considered as support for 
bus franchise in an initial phase. 
 
More recently, Cowie (2002: 147) noted that since privatization, 
five major British bus operators had emerged to dominate the market. He 
estimated the technical efficiency using data envelopment analysis. 
Under assumptions of constant and variable returns to scale, Cowie 
17 
concluded that over the period, efficiency had improved. However, this 
result could not be wholly attributed to the achievement of economies of 
scale (Cowie, 2002: 156). 
 
On the subject economies of scale, transport analysts had 
different opinions, Cowie and Asenova (1999: 231.) argued that 
“increasing returns to scale are found for smaller companies, but the size 
of such returns varies with the company type.” They also identified a 
minimum efficiency scale with constant returns beyond that point (Cowie 
and Asenova, 1999: 231). In the field of rail freight, Chapin and Schmidt 
(1999: 147) held a similar opinion that “mergers increase technical 
efficiency in the first stage, but reduce scale efficiency; many merged 
firms are larger than efficient scale.” Berechman and Giuliano (1985: 313) 
pointed out that the exact interpretation of theoretical concepts of scale 
economies and bus transit would influence the interpretation of empirical 
findings, given the fact that constant, decreasing and increasing returns to 
scale have all been reported. 
 
Interestingly, unlike the case of the UK, most analysis of bus 
services in other countries or regions seem to support increasing returns 
to scale. Some of them are discussed below. M. Filippini, et al. conducted 
several studies on the cost and ownership structures of the Swiss urban 
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public transport sector (Farsi, Fetz and Filippini, 2007; Farsi, Filippini 
and Kuenzle, 2006; Filippini and Prioni, 2003). “In Switzerland, 
providers of bus transportation are traditionally corporations, though a 
large part of their equity shares are still held by the public sector (federal 
government, cantons, municipalities)” (Filippini and Prioni, 2003: 683).  
 
Based on the theory regarding property rights that productivity 
and performance are higher in the private than in the public sector, 
Filippini and Prioni (2003: 689) partially confirmed that if the private 
sector holds shares in the company, efficiency is enhanced. Three years 
later, more advanced models were used to distinguish inefficiency from 
the unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity in a network industry, for 
instance local bus services (Farsi, Filippini and Kuenzle, 2006). The 
results finally suggested “increasing returns to scale” and “economies of 
scope” in the Swiss urban public transport sector (Farsi, Fetz and 
Filippini, 2007).  
 
Results similar to the Swiss case were found in the Italian 
regional bus industry. In one of the studies conducted in Italy, a 
translogarithmic variable cost function was estimated to assess the 
behaviour of returns to scale and the impact of network characteristics 
(Fraquelli, Piacenza and Abrate, 2004). This analysis was based on a 
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sample of 45 Italian municipal companies observed from 1996 to 1998 
and including both specialized and mixed transit operators. The results 
confirmed the existence of natural monopoly in the industry and support 
a regulation introducing competitive tenders to access to the market 
(Fraquelli, Piacenza and Abrate, 2004). Cambini and Filippini (2003) 
also pointed out that one of the main problems Italian local authorities 
had to face is setting the area size to be assigned a franchised monopoly. 
“The empirical results showed that the bus transportation sector is 
characterized by the presence of economies of density and scale; and 
implied that the best strategy for introducing competition in the bus 
industry is a competitive tendering approach for an area of given 
dimension and not necessarily a route-by-route tendering.” (Cambini and 
Filippini, 2003: 163)  
 
Similar arguments and proposals were also raised in the U.S. 
context. For example, Shleifer argued that “in the typical regulatory 
scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs.” 
(Shleifer, 1985: 319) However, if a mechanism could be established so 
that the price the regulated firm receives depends on the costs of identical 
firms, each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction in 
equilibrium (Shleifer, 1985: 319). In other words, a competitive tendering 
approach can be an appropriate mechanism. Viton (1993) also proposed 
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to consolidate larger systems for public urban transit services in the San 
Francisco Bay area, so that economies of scale can be realized.  
 
Finally, Asian transport studies had similar conclusions. For 
example, Indian scholars estimated the determinants of cost inefficiency 
of several publicly operated passenger-bus transportation companies in 
terms of their ownership structure as well as other firm-specific 
characteristics: inefficiency shall be specified in such a way that both its 
mean and variance are firm- and time-specific. (Bhattacharyya, 
Kumbhakar and Bhattacharyya, 1995: 47)  
 
One of the Asian researches conducted in a neighboring region, 
Kaohsiung, Taiwan Province, concluded that the Kaohsiung City Bus 
(KCB) could obtain cost-saving benefits by extending its output scale 
because of the existence of “returns to density” (Shaw-Er, Wang and 
Chen, 2005: 1399). It employed the concept of “economies of density” 
and thus noted the effects of technological progress could lead to cost 
saving for the KCB (Shaw-Er, Wang and Chen, 2005). This empirical 
finding shed light on private organizations’ incentive for investment in 
research and development. However, this is not a suitable model for 
Hong Kong since the public transportation in Kaohsiung is not widely 
used by the public in terms of the users to population ratio. Therefore, the 
21 
model of Filippini and Prioni’s (2003) about bus service provision in 
Switzerland is adopted because of similar popularity in the public 
transportation.  
 
Hong Kong Historical Review 
 
This historical review aims at obtaining a more comprehensive 
understanding of the bus franchise in Hong Kong so as to provide a 
clearer context for the research. First of all, the beginning and intention of 
the government bus franchise is examined from the government’s 
perspective. Then, the development of three existing franchised bus 
companies and one former franchised bus company is described to 
provide background information for hypotheses testing. Finally, the 
impacts of the operation of the Mass Transit Railway, which started in 
1979 (Hong Kong Annual Report, 1980: 149), are discussed. All figures 
and relevant references are made to Hong Kong Annual Report and the 
Hong Kong Bus written by Chan (1999). 
 
The Genesis of A Bus Franchise 
Coase mentioned that “a government department, in making up its 
mind whether or not to undertake a particular activity, should weigh 
against the benefits this would confer, the costs which are also involved: 
22 
that is, the value of the production elsewhere which would otherwise be 
enjoyed.” (Coase, 1959: 21) The Hong Kong Government in 1933, when 
the first bus franchises were granted, was thinking exactly this way. 
 
As implied from the Appendix A of the “Report on the Finances 
for the Year 1933” of Hong Kong, the initiative of bus franchise aimed at 
increasing the government revenue. The China Motor Bus Company 
(CMB) and the Kowloon Motor Bus Company (KMB) were first granted 
the right to operate bus services respectively on the Island of Hong Kong 
and the Kowloon Peninsula (including the New Territories) on 11 June 
that year. The two companies, categorized as public utilities companies 
had to pay royalties to the government based on gross annual receipts. At 
the same time, the Hong Kong and Yaumati Ferry Company was also 
granted a similar right to operate a passenger and vehicles ferry service in 
the Harbour. The royalties payable by KMB and CMB in the year of 1933 
were $63,592 and $48,287 respectively. These two amounts were 
categorized as “miscellaneous receipts” in that year’s Financial report. 
Three new subheads under the last classification appear 
for the first time in 1933 as a result of franchises granted 
to Motor Bus and Ferry Companies as follows: - 
The China Motor Bus Company and the Kowloon Motor 
Bus Company for the privilege of maintaining services of 
23 
motor buses on the Island of Hong Kong and the Kowloon 
Peninsula including the New Territories respectively for a 
period of 15 years from the 11th June 1933 pay certain 
royalties or percentages based upon gross annual receipts. 
The Hong Kong and Yaumati Ferry Company for the 
privilege of maintaining a passenger and vehicles ferry 
service for a period of 15 years from the 12th June 1933 
pay certain royalties or percentages based upon gross 
annual receipts. (Financial Report, 1933: A (1) 2) 
 
Later in that year, the Legislative Council addressed the issue 
regarding operational defects from the franchised bus companies. It was 
recorded in the Hong Kong Legislative Council Minutes, dated 12 
October 1933, that ‘constant breakdowns of buses took place, especially 
when going up Garden Road’. (4: 115) In addition, certain grievances 
regarding the bus services on the Kowloon side were also reported in the 
South China Moring Post at that time. It thus raised the issue on drivers’ 
low wage rate, which resulted in the lack of professional experience and 
thus was probably the cause to the poor bus services.  
At first, no doubt, there was every disposition on the part 
of the bus-using public to adopt rather a lenient view of 
the shortcomings of the new services on both sides of the 
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Harbour, having regard to the fact that new Companies 
were taking over these services and that it was only fair to 
give them sufficient time to get into their stride. 
Such lenient considerations are, however, now no longer 
applicable seeing that these new bus services have already 
been running for four months. 
At the commencement of the new services, constant 
breakdowns of buses took place, especially when going up 
Garden Road, and, even recently, breakdowns on Garden 
Road, still occur, whereas such breakdowns under the 
regime of the Hong Kong Hotel Company were 
practically unknown. 
If such breakdowns are in any way attributable to the 
obtaining of less experienced drivers at lower wages, then 
such saving has been distinctly false economy, both from 
the point of view of the Company and also of the 
travelling public who have a right to expect a punctual and 
efficient service. 
Another complaint which has been voiced in the columns 
of the local Press, and which is doubtless also due, in a 
measure, to drivers having insufficient experience, is the 
failure of the buses, especially on the Hong Kong side of 
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the Harbour, to keep to a proper regular schedule of times, 
thereby causing grave inconvenience to passengers going 
to and from their offices. 
In Kowloon special grievances have recently been 
ventilated in the South China Moring Post, namely the 
insufficiency of buses on certain routes at certain hours. 
We trust that the Government will fully investigate the 
above matters with a view to their being remedied as it is 
so obviously necessary that the regularity and efficiency 
of public utility companies should, in the interests of the 
public, be fully maintained. (Hong Kong Legislative 
Council Minutes 12th October 1933: 115) 
 
In the Hong Kong Government’s Reports on the Finances of the 
following years, the royalties payable by the two franchised bus 
companies were recorded in details. In most of the initial few years, the 
royalties payable were reported to outperform the estimation made in the 
previous year. Particularly, in the year of 1937 and 1938 the royalties 
payable increased substantially. It was reported that the increased 
royalties payable on gross receipts by omnibus and ferry companies 
contributed to the satisfactory fiscal result in 1937, whereas the increase 
reflected the increase in population. In 1938 the recorded substantial 
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increases were also attributed to the correspondingly increasing 
magnitude of the population. 
The estimated revenue from Head 9, Miscellaneous 
Receipts, was more than doubled as a result of the 
abnormal conditions resulting in large royalty payments 
by the transportation companies. (1938 Financial Report: 
A 5) 
1934 Financial Report: 
Royalty payable by Kowloon Motor Bus Co., Ltd. was 
estimated to be $140,000, but was actually $128,094, 
decreased by $11,906. 
1935 Financial Report – Appendix A: 
Royalty payable by China Motor Bus Co. was estimated 
to be $110,000, but was actually $118,275, increased by 
$8,275. 
Royalty payable by Hong Kong & Yaumati Ferry Co. was 
estimated to be $90,000, but was actually $99,782, 
increased by $9,782. 
Royalty payable by Kowloon Motor Bus Co., Ltd. was 
estimated to be $132,000, but was actually $117,505, 
decreased by $14,495. 
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1936 Financial Report – Appendix A: 
Royalty payable by China Motor Bus Co. was estimated 
to be $112,000, but was actually $124,088, increased by 
$12,088. 
1937 Financial Report: 
Royalty payable by China Motor Bus Co. was estimated 
to be $96,000, but was actually $128,708, increased by 
$32,708. 
Royalty payable by Kowloon Motor Bus Co., Ltd. was 
estimated to be $114,500, but was actually $140,991, 
increased by $26,491. 
1938 Financial Report: 
Royalty payable by China Motor Bus Co. was estimated 
to be $110,000, but was actually $194,702.65, increased 
by $84,702.65. 
Royalty payable by Hong Kong & Yaumati Ferry Co. was 
estimated to be $124,000, but was actually $222,495.65, 
increased by $98,495.65. 
Royalty payable by Kowloon Motor Bus Co., Ltd. was 
estimated to be $126,000, but was actually $225,672.29, 
increased by $99,672.29. 
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1939 Financial Report: 
Royalty payable by China Motor Bus Co. was estimated 
to be $175,000, but was actually $257,874.17, increased 
by $82,874.17. 
Royalty payable by Hong Kong & Yaumati Ferry Co. was 
estimated to be $175,000, but was actually $429,119.75, 
increased by $254,119.75. 
Royalty payable by Kowloon Motor Bus Co., Ltd. was 
estimated to be $180,000, but was actually $382,281.56, 
increased by $148,281.56. 
 
In the 1939 Taxation Committee Report, published 6 years after 
the franchise was granted, ‘Miscellaneous revenue, including royalties 
from public utilities’ was regarded as ‘one of the main classes of revenue 
to be met with in the modern world’. The objective of the report was to 
summarize pros and cons of the existing taxation, and further discussed 
the possibility of extending the taxation base and taxation rate in Hong 
Kong to increase government revenue. It further discussed “the 
possibility of securing revenue from the introduction of other monopolies. 
Transport Companies (Buses, trams and ferries) at that time were still 
categorized as utility companies. It was reported that the royalties 
collected from Public Utilities (Including Ferry Licenses) reached at 
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$1,033,401, which took approximately 3% of the total government 
revenue that year. It was decided that the rate for the franchised bus 
companies should be remained unchanged. 
We have considered whether increased revenue could be 
derived from public utilities – transport, electricity, gas, 
telephones, etc. – having due regard to the possibility of 
the public being involved in increased charges.  
We consider that the present arrangement should be left 
undisturbed. We observe, however, that the Tramways’ 
royalty will increase to 25% of the company’s working 
profits in the near future and that the royalties payable by 
the Ferry Companies are already increasing. (1939 
Taxation Committee Report: 95) 
 
The operation of bus franchise became finally governed by law in 
1975 as a new Bill, Public Omnibus Services Ordinance1, was introduced 
into the Legislative Council. Public omnibus services are operated under 
franchises granted in accordance with the provisions of the Public 
Omnibus Services Ordinance, which came into operation on September 1, 
1975. Three private companied provide facilities on specified routes with 
                                                            
 
1See the Public Bus Services Ordinance Cap 230, Laws of Hong Kong 
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schedules of service laid down by the Transport Department covering 
routes, timetables, faretables, journey distance, journey time, vehicle 
allocation, and vehicle carrying capacities. Furthermore, the franchise 
started to be granted in a new fashion in 1975: the franchise was granted 
route by route instead of by different regions. 
With the introduction of the new public Omnibus 
Services Ordinance, both CMB and KMB began 
operating under new franchises on September 1. The 
franchises give the companies exclusive rights to 
operate bus services on specified routes as opposed to 
the previous franchises which were granted on a 
geographical basis. A feature of the new franchises is 
the fixing for the first time of a permitted rate of return 
for the companies. In the case of KMB, the return rate 
is 16 per cent based on the valuation of its fixed assets 
in July 1959 – when the company’s assets were last 
valued. For CMB, the return rate is 15 per cent based 
on a valuation carried out in 1962 when the company 
first issued its shares to the public. Another feature is 
the establishment of a profit control scheme under 
which each company is required to maintain a 
Development Fund, with any profits earned in excess 
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of the permitted rate of return being credited to the 
fund. In a year when either company earns less than 
the permitted rate of return, it will be allowed to draw 
from the fund the amount needed to bring it up to the 
permitted return rate. The main purpose of the fund is 
to assist with capital expansion of bus operations by 
ensuring retention of profits in the company for this 
purpose, and also to serve as a profit equalization fund. 
The new franchises will last for 10 years in the first 
instance, up to August 31, 1985. But the concept of a 
rolling franchise has been accepted, with the 
possibility of extensions every two years following 
comprehensive reviews of the companies’ operations 
and their performance under the franchises. An 
additional provision of the Public Omnibus Services 
Ordinance is that the Governor may appoint up to two 
directors to each company’s Board of Directors, and 
these directors would be empowered to represent the 
public interest rather than that of the shareholders. 
(Hong Kong Annual Report, 1976: 136-137) 
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The Development of the Franchised Bus Companies 
The Kowloon Motor Bus (1933) Company 
The Kowloon Motor Bus (1933) Company (KMB), established on 
13 April 1933, started its franchised bus operation on 11 June 1933. It 
has the longest history of running franchise bus transit service in Hong 
Kong: 76 years by 2009.  
 
Bus services in Kowloon and the New Territories were operated 
by KMB in accordance with the franchise granted by the government in 
1933. KMB got its franchise renewed first in year 1948 for a further 10 
years. Later in 1960, its franchise was extended till 1975. Its bus fares 
began to adopt a charge based on different sections of the routes in the 
same year. In 1968, negotiations started between the KMB and the Hong 
Kong Government on the need to revise the financial terms of the 
franchise as a consequence of KMB’s intention of increasing its carrying 
capacity. In year 1975, KMB’s franchise was extended for another 10 
years, however, subject to review every two years. The latest recorded 
extension on the bus franchise for KMB was in year 1997, in which the 
franchise was going to expire on 31 July 2007. Currently, KMB still 
operates as a franchised bus company mainly in Kowloon and the New 
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Territories. The franchise has a further period not exceeding 5 years, till 
31 July 2012. (s. 6 (2), Public Bus Services Ordinance2) 
 
KMB once faced extreme difficulties of buses shortage as a 
number of its buses were commandeered by the Japanese during the 
Occupation (December 1941- August 1945) according to the Hong Kong 
Annual Report of 1946 and 1947. As a result, most of the buses were so 
damaged that they were not usable for picking up passengers after 
liberation in August 1945. Although “skeleton services” were resumed 
immediately, KMB had to make use of trucks as “makeshift buses” in 
other non-major routes. Although KMB ordered new buses from Britain, 
the deliveries during the first few years were always delayed. This bus 
shortage led the company into severe situations. Consequently, 
passengers were asked for higher fares, which was as twice as the pre-war 
time. This situation continued from the year 1946 through the year 1947, 
KMB succeeded in getting 30 new buses delivered. Although 
encountering higher operation costs, KMB was able to reduce fares on 
suburban routes. Because of the swollen population and the delay from 
bus order deliveries, KMB had not succeeded in withdrawing all 
makeshift buses until the year 1952.  
                                                            
 
2 See the Public Bus Services Ordinance Cap 230, Laws of Hong Kong 
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The construction of the first depot for KMB buses commenced in 
1955 at To Kwa Wan. This was completed in 1958. Another depot at Lai 
Chi Kok commenced in July the same year and was ready for occupation 
by the middle of 1958. Later, as services expended, land at Kwun Tung 
with a total area of approximately 200,000 square feet was purchased by 
KMB in 1961 to construct two multi-storey depots. By the end of year 
1965, two three-storey bus depots had been commissioned while a third 
was nearing completion. These depots, which accommodated over 1,000 
buses, were believed to be the first multi-storey double-decker bus depots 
in the world. (Hong Kong Annual Report, 1946: 90; 1947: 114-115; 1952: 
138; 1955: 153-154; 1958: 222; 1961: 235; 1965: 187-188) 
 
Notably, KMB became a listed company in year 1961. In 1980 
Sun Hung Kai Properties, which became one of the largest local 
developer, purchased 30% of KMB’s shares. The impact of the property 
developer’s involvement shall be examined in later sections. Without 
doubt, KMB can be regarded as a pioneer in new technology utilization 
among the franchise bus companies in Hong Kong. It introduced 64 
different bus models from 1933 to 1998, and the size of the bus fleet far 
exceeding other companies.  
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The China Motor Bus Company 
The China Motor Bus Company (CMB) started its franchise 
operation together with KMB on 11 June 1933. However, it lost its 
franchise on 31 August 1998. At the beginning of its franchise, CMB’s 
operation concentrated on the Hong Kong Island. It faced similar 
difficulties of bus shortage as KMB after the defeat of Japan. Although 
CMB also ordered new buses from Britain, the deliveries during the first 
few years were always delayed. This situation continued from the year 
1946 through the year 1947. CMB was not as fortunate as KMB: it had to 
wait until the year 1948 to get new buses delivered from Britain. In 
addition to the bus supplies shortage, CMB also encountered difficulties 
in finding men with suitable qualifications for training as bus drivers 
during that period. The significantly increased demand had partially 
alleviated the operation difficulty. (Hong Kong Annual Report, 1946: 90; 
1947: 114-115)  
 
According to the Hong Kong Annual Report (1957: 252-253) 
CMB firstly commenced its depot construction in January 1957 at North 
Point, at which the Company also set up its staff quarters and welfare 
centre. For garaging of vehicles at night, the stores department, machine 
shops, and component overhaul sections had all been located on the upper 
storeys of the building. CMB acquired at public auction a further site of 
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20,000 square feet for garaging its expanding fleet in the latter part of 
1958. By the year of 1961, CMB also provides low cost housing for some 
250 employees and their families and planned additional housing units at 
its new King’s Road Depot. (Hong Kong Annual Report, 1961: 235) In 
1962, CMB became a listed company, one year later than KMB. (Chan, 
1999) At the end of 1975, CMB then completed a multi-storey depot at 
Chai Wan capable for accommodating 450 large capacity double-deck 
buses. (Hong Kong Annual Report, 1976: 136-137) 
 
The government had carried out a review with public participation 
to examine the cost effectiveness of the companies’ operations including 
bus depot. It was initiated in April 1981, and was completed in June 1982. 
During the 65 years of its franchised bus transit service, CMB introduced 
totally 44 bus models, at an average rate of one every 1.5 years one new 
model introduced, compared with the one every 0.88 year of KMB. 
 
In year 1986, the length of extension of bus franchises for KMB 
and CMB diverted for the first time. When the new extension period was 
10 years for KMB, it was only three years for CMB. Chan (1999) 
mentioned that the deteriorating service of CMB as a major concern to 
the Government.  
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Since 1986, the franchise period granted by the government to 
CMB had been two to three years in length. Finally, in year 1993, CMB’s 
franchise was extended for another two years but some of its franchises 
on certain routes were ceased. Some of the franchised routes of CMB 
were taken over by the CityBus in the following 5 years until CMB lost 
all franchise routes in the year 1998. According to the Public Bus 
Services Ordinance3 , CMB at least would notice the cessation of its 
franchise not less than 9 months before the expiry of the period.  
 
The CityBus 
The CityBus Limited (CTB) had been running non-franchised bus 
services since 1979. It became the fourth Hong Kong franchised bus 
operator in 1991 when first obtained a franchise for a bus route between 
Central (Macau Ferry) and MacDonnell Road (12A) in 1991. It should be 
noticed that this was the first franchised bus route awarded by 
competitive tender. In 1993, CTB took over 26 routes, including 2 cross-
harbour routes, from CMB. Later in 1995, CTB took over another 14 
routes from the CMB, and became one of the two major bus operators on 
the Island. The latest record shows that CTB operates two bus networks 
under two franchises.  
                                                            
 
3 See the Public Bus Services Ordinance Cap 230, Laws of Hong Kong 
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CTB’s first franchise on Hong Kong Island covers the period 
from 1 September, 1996, to 30 June, 2006. It also had a second 
franchise – lasting from 1 June 1997 until 31 May 2003 – to operate a 
network of 15 routes linking major district in Hong Kong and Kowloon 
with Tung Chung and the new airport at Chek Lap Kok. The current 
franchises run from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2011 and 1 June 2008 to 31 
May 2013 respectively as a further franchise period can not exceed 5 
years. (s. 6 (2), Public Bus Services Ordinance4) 
 
The New World First Bus 
A new franchise was awarded to the New World First Bus 
Services Limited (NWFB) to operate on Hong Kong Island from 
September 1, 1998. It started from taking over the 88 routes from CMB, 
which ended all its franchised bus services on the same date. It should be 
noticed that both CTB and NWFB are members of the Chow Tai Fook 
Enterprises and NWS Holdings, the latter also a subsidiary of one of the 
biggest local property developers, New World Development. 
 
                                                            
 
4 See the Public Bus Services Ordinance Cap 230, Laws of Hong Kong 
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Impacts of the MTR 
The operation of the MTR and the introduction of higher bus fares 
granted in February 1980 had a significant effect on bus services. This 
was particularly noticeable on the cross-harbour and coach services 
routes, and on routes running parallel to the railway, where demand 
dropped.  
 
Since 1982, KMB concentrated its services expansion on the 
developing new towns in the New Territories partially to avoid 
competition with the MTR. The increase in that year in the rail capacity 
significantly improved services to the public, and bus passenger demand 
along the MTR corridors generally fell by 16 per cent. Nevertheless, the 
easing of pressure on these services has brought benefits in terms of less 
overcrowding and reduced waiting times. CMB also tried to make 
reorganizations on its services to confront the challenges due to operation 
of the MTR Island Line, including MTR feeder services. 
 
With the opening of the first cross-harbour tunnel (Hung Hom to 
Causeway Bay) to traffic on August 3, 1972, the two major bus 
companies, CMB and KMB, introduced three jointly operated services 
linking the urban areas of Kowloon and Hong Kong Island. In the 
following years, these increased to 5, 6, 12 and finally 18 routes in 1979. 
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These routes were very popular among the passengers until the operation 
of the first phase of the MTR in 1981. The opening of the MTR and the 
introduction of higher bus fares in February 1981 had a significant effect 
on bus services. This was particularly noticeable on the cross-harbour 
and coach services routes, and on routes running parallel to the railway, 
where demand dropped. The cross harbour bus service network finally 
had a moderate expansion during the year of 1988 when the cross 
harbour section of MTR had reached its capacity in the peak period. 
Nowadays, 73 routes are operated by individual companies or jointly 
provided.  
 
Judging from Figure 1, we can actually find out that in the first 
three years of the operation of the MTR, both KMB and CMB had no 
increase in their fleet size. Furthermore, the number of MTR riders kept 
increasing, exerting sheer pressure on the franchised bus transit services. 
A detailed quantitative study of the MTR impacts using publicly 
available data is made in later sections of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter introduces three hypotheses designed to achieve the 
objectives of this dissertation. Then, it discusses the methodology 
adopted for evaluation of the hypotheses, which is based on the cost 
function specified in the work of Filippini and Prioni (2003). Finally, and 
more importantly, it describes the data collected and their limitations. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
As discussed in the literature review, a private ownership 
structure may contribute to the service efficiency comparing with a public 
ownership structure. Furthermore, a monopoly can be justified on 
grounds of economies of scale. Nevertheless, the extent of monopoly 
power is more critical as competition may also increase market efficiency.  
 
There can be thus three empirical hypotheses regarding the 
market efficiency of bus transit services in Hong Kong in light of their 
historical development:  
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(1) The involvement of property developers in the bus transit companies 
has a positive impact on service efficiency, measured in terms of 
cost per kilometre, (H1);  
(2) the market of bus transit services in Hong Kong is subject to 
increasing return to scale, (H2); and  
(3) the operation of MTR, the major competitor with bus transit, has a 
positive impact on service efficiency, (H3). 
 
Methodology 
 
As mentioned above in the literature review, a good reference is 
the work of Filippini and Prioni (2003) on bus service provision in 
Switzerland. In particular, it provides a mathematic way of specifying the 
cost function for bus transit industry.  
 
The total cost of a bus transit company C is assumed to be a 
function of the output y, the network characteristic n, the factor prices p 
(labour L, capital C and energy E) and the variable P representing the 
ownership variable. Finally, the variable T captures the effect of technical 
change occurring over time.” (Filippini and Prioni, 2003: 685) 
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Given the above definition and the specific situation in Hong Kong, the 
following cost function is specified for evaluation: 
 
C= c(Mileage, Passenger, P, M, L, Deflator) 
 
where C is the total cost of a bus transit company and is assumed to be a 
function of the variable Mileage, which refers to the mileage the buses 
cover in one year; 
variable Passenger, which stands for the passengers the buses carry in one 
year; 
variable P, which represents the ownership variable; 
variable M, which captures the presence of MTR operation; and 
variable L, which indicates the major service location of different 
companies.  
Finally, the Deflator (the GDP Deflator) captures the changes in price 
levels over time as the data panel has a relative long span of 46 years (i.e., 
1961 to 2007). 
 
It is worth mentioning that the GDP Deflator is used instead of 
the CPI (Consumer Price Index), which is also a common indicator for 
price level change. The GDP deflator is chosen to reflect on the changes 
in price levels. As a matter of fact, there is no significant difference in 
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terms of results derived under these alternative price indicators. 
Nevertheless, the GDP Deflator is considered a more proper indicator 
because of the nature of bus fares. As mentioned in the above historical 
review, the profit margins for each individual bus company are closely 
related to government decisions. The government collects loyalties from 
the franchise bus companies based on their profits and approves/rejects 
any proposed changes in bus fares. Therefore, a GDP deflator showed 
better capture the change in price levels in the nominal bus fare changes. 
 
Both variables “Mileage” and “Passenger” are continuous 
variables that represent the output of the bus company. P, M and L are all 
dummy variables. P equals 1 if parts or all of the shares of a bus transit 
company are held by a property developer; 0 if otherwise. M equals 1 if it 
is a year in which MTR operates; 0 if not. L equals 1 if a company 
operates mainly on Hong Kong Island; 0 if it operates in Kowloon and 
the New Territories. The DGP deflator is also a continuous variable and 
is in an index form, taking the year 2006 price level as 100. 
 
Given the focus of H1 is on ownership structure, the data 
collected from the three existing and one former franchised bus transit 
companies in Hong Kong are pooled together in the regression model. 
This aims at identifying the coefficient for the dummy variable P. Recall 
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that the previous review on franchised bus services in Hong Kong, Sun 
Hung Kai Properties first purchased 30% shares of the Kowloon Motor 
Bus (1933) Corporate in 1980; whereas the New World Development 
Company Limited acted as the holding company of both Citybus and the 
New World First Bus from the beginning of their franchises in the year of 
1991 and 1998 respectively. On the other hand, there are no records of 
any property developer holding shares in the former franchised bus 
company, the China Motor Bus Company, despite there was a joint 
venture formed between CMB and the Swire Properties Limited for a 
residential development in the Eastern District of Hong Kong in 2007.  
 
The second dummy variable M is 1 only when its operation is in 
the same region. For example, the MTR began its first phase of operation 
in Kowloon in 1979, whereas its Island Line commenced in 1985. In 
other words, for observations for KMB, M equals 1 from 1979 onwards; 
for CMB, M equals 1 from 1985 onwards. M is 1 for all observations 
about CTB and NWFB. Given the dominant physical locations of bus 
operations of different companies, L equals 1 for CMB, CTB and NWFB; 
and 0 for KMB. 
 
It should also be noticed that in the model, the equation 
capturing the service efficiency level is represented by a function to the 
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midpoint between the minimum fare and maximum fare charged. 
Furthermore, the fares charged are deflated using respective indicators. 
The rationale for choosing the service fees charged as cost indicator is 
twofold. For one thing, the service efficiency should be measured in 
terms of cost per kilometre, thus making the bus fare charged according 
to service mileage a proper dependent variable for the model. For another 
thing, the bus fare statistics shown in the Hong Kong Annual Reports and 
the book The Hong Kong Bus by Chen (1999) are the most accurate data 
available given the time limitation for writing this dissertation.  
 
Data Descriptions 
 
There is a total of 89 observations for the regression test. A total 
of 40 observations from KMB from year 1961 to 2007 with 7 years are 
omitted in the interviewing years. The omission is due to incomplete 
records or exceptional situations which may lead to misinterpretation of 
the data. For example, the observations for the years 1967 and 1968 are 
omitted because of political disturbances.  
“Throughout the troubles, there was never a complete 
suspension of public transport, although services had to be 
reduced by varying degrees because of the loss of staff by 
the companies. 
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“On June 23, the CMB found itself with approximately 46 
per cent staff and the KMB with 32 per cent [still reporting 
duties]. After the stoppages, a programme of re-
employment of suspended or dismissed employees met 
with poor response and the companies had to recruit new 
and untrained labour. This ruled out any chance of an 
immediate return to normal operating conditions. 
“By the end of 1967, the CMB was operating 77 per cent 
of normal services and the KMB 75 per cent.” (Hong Kong 
Annual Report, 1967: 190-191) 
“It is, perhaps, unrealistic to compare transport statistics 
for 1968 with those of the preceding year since the 
operations of all five major public transport companies 
were affected in varying degrees by stoppages during the 
1967 disturbances.” (Hong Kong Annual Report, 1968: 
200-201) 
 
Among the 89 observations, 28 are for the CMB for the year 
1961 to 1998 (with data of 10 years omitted for similar reasons as above).  
A total of 12 observations are for the Citybus for the year 1993 to 2007 
with 3 years omitted. A total of 9 observations are for New World First 
Bus for the year 1998 to 2007 with 1 year omitted. 
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 In addition to the regression model capturing the ownership 
structure effect to service efficiency, there are also three separate models 
for four franchised bus companies aiming at canvassing the issue of 
economies of scale in the second hypothesis. 
 
For KMB, the charge midpoint depends on passenger carried 
per year, ownership structure, MTR operation and finally Deflator 
capturing the change of price level. The passenger carried per year is 
assumed to be a proper measure for the operation scale. However, there is 
no dummy variable P in the models for CMB, CTB or NWFB as they did 
not encounter any change in ownership structure during the study period. 
Finally, there is no dummy variable M in the models for CTB or NWFB 
as the MTR keeps operating during the study period. The number of 
observations for each company is the same as it is in the first model for 
ownership structure. 
 
For the third hypothesis, regarding the impact of MTR 
operation, the results can be inferred from three models above, namely, 
the model pooled with data coming from four companies and also two 
individual models for both KMB and CMB because they capture the 
MTR operation by the dummy variable M. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Following the discussion on hypotheses and methodologies in the 
last chapter, this chapter analyzes the empirical results for all three 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis (H1) is not supported by any empirical 
evidence in the context of Hong Kong; whereas the second hypothesis 
(H2) is partially supported and the third hypothesis (H3) is fully 
supported by the data. 
 
Findings about Ownership Structures 
 
First of all, the first hypothesis (H1) that the involvement of 
property developers in the bus transit companies has a positive impact on 
the service efficiency is not supported. As we can observe from Table 1, 
the coefficient of the dummy variable P is positive. The result is 
significant as both R-squared and Adjusted R-squared are greater than 
0.75. Furthermore, the Probability of P is less that 0.1%. When P is 
positive, it means that the bus fare increases when a property developer 
partially or fully holds the bus transit company’s shares. This result 
indeed refutes the argument for the first hypothesis.  
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In addition to the pooled data from four franchised bus transit 
companies, the coefficient of P is also positive in the individual model for 
KMB. As shown in Table 2, the result is significant, given the values of 
R-squared and Adjusted R-squared. 
 
Nevertheless, bus fare is only an indicator of the cost per 
kilometre rather than the exact cost. In other words, the non supporting 
results could be the result of data limitations. Recall that the original cost 
function indentifies the cost as the dependent variable. However due to 
various limitations5, the only available data are the bus fares charged by 
different bus companies. In addition, as there is no way to access such 
key information as the profits or the actual operational costs of different 
companies, bus fares become the best alternative cost indicator. As a 
result, when bus fare increases, the operational costs may not necessary 
increase at the same time. Hence, it can be imperfect in capturing the 
trend of changes in costs over time.  
 
                                                            
 
5 Because of the limitation of information available to the general public, the profit 
margins of different bus companies are not known. Given the time limitation of 
writing this dissertation, the bus fares recorded in the Hong Kong Annual Report 
became one of the best alternatives of cost per kilometer. 
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On the other hand, as we can observe from Table 7, the dummy 
variable P in the individual model for KMB, with the price level deflated 
by CPI (instead of the GDP deflator), has a positive coefficient. This 
result does not refute the first hypothesis (H1) and is considered to be 
significant given the high values of both the R-squared and Adjusted R-
squared. This result indicates that the bus fare charged after a property 
developer came into the picture has actually decreased. In other words, at 
least for KMB, the involvement of a property developer (in which case 
Sun Hung Kai Properties) as an owner of its shares has improved its 
service efficiency in terms of fares. Nevertheless, no concrete conclusion 
can be drawn, as the probability of the coefficient is approximately 0.75, 
suggesting inaccuracy of the results. At the same time, the pooled data 
model deflated by CPI, as shown in Table 6, also shows a positive 
coefficient of P at a significant level of 1% in terms of probability of error.  
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Dependent Variable: CHARGE1   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/09   Time: 19:55   
Sample: 1 89    
Included observations: 89   
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.425498 2.349802 -0.181078 0.8567 
PASSENGER -0.001229 0.002893 -0.424725 0.6721 
P 4.558732 1.297820 3.512608 0.0007 
M -2.717586 1.763485 -1.541031 0.1271 
L 0.369281 2.098635 0.175962 0.8608 
DEFLATOR 0.141604 0.018791 7.535621 0.0000 
R-squared 0.780585     Mean dependent var 9.472584 
Adjusted R-squared 0.767367     S.D. dependent var 7.556801 
S.E. of regression 3.644798     Akaike info criterion 5.489514 
Sum squared resid 1102.618     Schwarz criterion 5.657288 
Log likelihood -238.2834     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.557139 
F-statistic 59.05572     Durbin-Watson stat 0.453816 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Table 1 Pooled Data Results (GDP Deflator) 
 
There can be at least one definite conclusion drawn from these 
conflicting results: the impact on service efficiency due to a property 
developer becoming a holder of the bus company’s shares demands more 
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detailed investigation. One of the most important issues is to find out the 
exact costs of different franchised bus companies over time.  
 
For another thing, the cost function can be refined by taking the 
network impact into consideration, by looking into such variables as the 
number of routes of different bus companies and the average number of 
bus stops per route.  
Dependent Variable: CHARGE2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/09   Time: 20:00   
Sample: 1 89    
Included observations: 89   
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -1.815964 2.068466 -0.877928 0.3825 
PASSENGER -0.001102 0.002536 -0.434756 0.6649 
P 3.090656 1.159916 2.664551 0.0093 
M -3.337529 1.521474 -2.193616 0.0311 
L -0.273113 1.843494 -0.148150 0.8826 
CPI 0.205318 0.018975 10.82027 0.0000 
R-squared 0.853996 Mean dependent var 10.10247 
Adjusted R-squared 0.845200 S.D. dependent var 8.122616 
S.E. of regression 3.195811 Akaike info criterion 5.226595 
Sum squared resid 847.6965 Schwarz criterion 5.394368 
Log likelihood -226.5835 Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.294219 
F-statistic 97.09523 Durbin-Watson stat 0.501978 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Table 2 Pooled Data Results (CPI) 
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Findings on Economies of Scale 
 
The second hypothesis (H2) that the market of bus transit services 
in Hong Kong is subject to increasing return to scale can be partially 
proved by individual studies on the four franchised bus companies. 
Different companies have different performance in terms of economies of 
scale. 
 
First of all, the Kowloon Motor Bus (1933) Company is enjoying 
increasing return to scale as shown by the result in Table 2. The 
coefficient of the passenger is approximately -0.0004, which means that it 
is on a decreasing cost curve. The result is considered to be significant if 
only taking the values of both R-squared and Adjusted R-squared into 
consideration; its probability is considerably large at a value of 0.94.  
 
At the same time, empirical evidence indicates that both China 
Motor Bus Company and New World First Bus Company are also 
enjoying increasing return to scale as their coefficient of the passenger is 
-0.009 and -0.003 respectively. Both results are considered significant 
given the R-squared and Adjusted R-squared and a probability less than 
1% as shown in Table 5.3 and Table 5.5. As showing in Table 4, the 
coefficient of passenger is positive 0.098. Notably, this result is 
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significant not only in terms of large values of both R-squared and 
Adjusted R-squared but also probability, which is far below 0.1%.  
 
Dependent Variable: CHARGE1   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/21/09   Time: 11:48   
Sample: 1 40    
Included observations: 40   
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.501520 3.132551 -0.160100 0.8737 
PASSENGER -0.000402 0.005206 -0.077244 0.9389 
P 8.91E-05 2.999425 2.97E-05 1.0000 
M -1.485032 3.313042 -0.448238 0.6567 
DEFLATOR 0.164586 0.019153 8.593015 0.0000 
R-squared 0.853565     Mean dependent var 8.226000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.836830     S.D. dependent var 6.823498 
S.E. of regression 2.756304     Akaike info criterion 4.982127 
Sum squared resid 265.9023     Schwarz criterion 5.193237 
Log likelihood -94.64253     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.058457 
F-statistic 51.00367     Durbin-Watson stat 0.346608 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Table 3 Return to Scale of KMB (GDP Deflator) 
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Dependent Variable: CHARGE1   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/21/09   Time: 11:28   
Sample: 1 28    
Included observations: 28   
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 1.186721 0.792074 1.498245 0.1471 
PASSENGER -0.009412 0.003064 -3.071380 0.0052 
M -2.025304 0.907204 -2.232468 0.0352 
DEFLATOR 0.138680 0.011472 12.08880 0.0000 
R-squared 0.944844     Mean dependent var 5.117500 
Adjusted R-squared 0.937950     S.D. dependent var 4.766947 
S.E. of regression 1.187443     Akaike info criterion 3.313046 
Sum squared resid 33.84052     Schwarz criterion 3.503361 
Log likelihood -42.38264     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.371227 
F-statistic 137.0432     Durbin-Watson stat 1.712988 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Table 4 Return to Scale of CMB (GDP Deflator) 
 
Recall that in the literature review, there is a split in opinions 
regarding the economies of scale in local bus transit services over the 
world. According to the logic of Cowie and Asenova (1999), CTB could 
have exceeded the efficiency level, beyond which there is no longer 
increasing but decreasing returns to scale. However, CTB is in fact 
smaller in scale than KMB in terms of the size of fleet, number of 
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passengers carried per year, number of routes or mileage covered per year. 
Yet KMB has economies of scale but CTB has not. This is contradictory 
to the proposition of Cowie and Asenova (1999) that “increasing returns 
to scale are found for smaller companies”. One of the possible 
explanations in favour of Cowie and Asenova is that the variables are not 
held constant for KMB and CTB. For example, the difference in the main 
service locations may have complicated the analysis.  
 
Besides, the difference in the ownership structures thus a 
management mode which may also contribute to this contradiction. The 
best evidence is that when comparing CTB and NWFB, the former is 
larger in scale in terms of the size of fleet, number of passengers carried 
per year, number of routes and mileage covered per year. It should be 
noticed that both CTB and NWFB are held under the NWS Group and 
both operate mainly on the Island. In other words, when these two 
companies operate under similar conditions, the smaller one (NWFB) 
reaps increasing returns to scale; whereas the bigger one (CTB) is not. In 
a nutshell, CTB may have already exceeded the efficiency level, beyond 
which a larger scale could not lead to a lower unit cost, given its current 
technology and service level. At the same time, other three franchised bus 
companies, including one former franchised company, are found to enjoy 
economies of scale.  
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The general implication of these results is that a monopoly power 
shall be allowed to a certain degree in the franchised bus service in Hong 
Kong. The reason is that a larger scale could lead to lower costs. 
 
Dependent Variable: CHARGE1   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/21/09   Time: 11:35   
Sample: 1 12    
Included observations: 12   
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 16.24352 6.444499 2.520525 0.0327 
PASSENGER 0.097712 0.007788 12.54601 0.0000 
DEFLATOR -0.130130 0.056329 -2.310185 0.0462 
R-squared 0.950294     Mean dependent var 17.99750 
Adjusted R-squared 0.939248     S.D. dependent var 7.237500 
S.E. of regression 1.783890     Akaike info criterion 4.207788 
Sum squared resid 28.64039     Schwarz criterion 4.329015 
Log likelihood -22.24673     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.162906 
F-statistic 86.03228     Durbin-Watson stat 1.645664 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
Table 5 Return to Scale of CTB (DGP Deflator)
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Dependent Variable: CHARGE1   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/21/09   Time: 11:41   
Sample: 1 9    
Included observations: 9   
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 35.70174 0.459052 77.77275 0.0000 
PASSENGER -0.003064 0.000695 -4.407838 0.0045 
DEFLATOR -0.165598 0.003419 -48.43416 0.0000 
R-squared 0.998386     Mean dependent var 17.19556 
Adjusted R-squared 0.997848     S.D. dependent var 1.481639 
S.E. of regression 0.068732     Akaike info criterion -2.256007 
Sum squared resid 0.028344     Schwarz criterion -2.190265 
Log likelihood 13.15203     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.397877 
F-statistic 1855.782     Durbin-Watson stat 2.886060 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Table 6 Return to Scale of NWFB (GDP Deflator) 
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It should be noticed that the test using CPI deflated data yield the 
same results. From Tables 7 to 10, we can observe that the coefficient of 
passenger of KMB is negative at 0.002; the measure for CMB negative 
0.012; CTB positive 0.103; and finally NWFB negative 0.0025. 
 
Dependent Variable: CHARGE2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/21/09   Time: 11:47   
Sample: 1 40    
Included observations: 40   
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -1.040712 2.503221 -0.415749 0.6801 
PASSENGER -0.001939 0.004184 -0.463470 0.6459 
P -0.742362 2.407999 -0.308290 0.7597 
M -0.915495 2.657287 -0.344523 0.7325 
CPI 0.218855 0.017472 12.52584 0.0000 
R-squared 0.921002 Mean dependent var 8.765500 
Adjusted R-squared 0.911973 S.D. dependent var 7.445549 
S.E. of regression 2.209041 Akaike info criterion 4.539463 
Sum squared resid 170.7952 Schwarz criterion 4.750573 
Log likelihood -85.78925 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.615793 
F-statistic 102.0119 Durbin-Watson stat 0.697992 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Table 7 Return to Scale of KMB (CPI) 
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Dependent Variable: CHARGE2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/21/09   Time: 11:29   
Sample: 1 28    
Included observations: 28   
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.489323 1.025056 0.477362 0.6374 
PASSENGER -0.012053 0.003893 -3.096113 0.0049 
M -1.707073 1.136430 -1.502137 0.1461 
CPI 0.181821 0.016951 10.72631 0.0000 
R-squared 0.934519     Mean dependent var 5.516429 
Adjusted R-squared 0.926334     S.D. dependent var 5.559239 
S.E. of regression 1.508861     Akaike info criterion 3.792151 
Sum squared resid 54.63987     Schwarz criterion 3.982466 
Log likelihood -49.09011     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.850332 
F-statistic 114.1729     Durbin-Watson stat 1.363867 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Table 8 Return to Scale of CMB (CPI) 
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Dependent Variable: CHARGE2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/21/09   Time: 11:36   
Sample: 1 12    
Included observations: 12   
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 10.14512 6.996930 1.449939 0.1810 
PASSENGER 0.103097 0.007815 13.19297 0.0000 
CPI -0.077485 0.072801 -1.064337 0.3149 
R-squared 0.954695     Mean dependent var 19.17083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944627     S.D. dependent var 7.147261 
S.E. of regression 1.681848     Akaike info criterion 4.089981 
Sum squared resid 25.45751     Schwarz criterion 4.211208 
Log likelihood -21.53989     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.045099 
F-statistic 94.82726     Durbin-Watson stat 1.804676 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
Table 9 Return to Scale of CTB (CPI) 
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Dependent Variable: CHARGE2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/21/09   Time: 11:41   
Sample: 1 9    
Included observations: 9   
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 38.80253 1.225638 31.65905 0.0000 
PASSENGER -0.002509 0.001166 -2.150913 0.0750 
CPI -0.197479 0.010373 -19.03815 0.0000 
R-squared 0.993199     Mean dependent var 18.22111 
Adjusted R-squared 0.990932     S.D. dependent var 0.947133 
S.E. of regression 0.090192     Akaike info criterion -1.712561 
Sum squared resid 0.048807     Schwarz criterion -1.646819 
Log likelihood 10.70652     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.854431 
F-statistic 438.1137     Durbin-Watson stat 2.482278 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Table 10 Return to Scale of NWFB (CPI) 
 
Findings on Impact of MTR 
 
Finally, the third hypothesis that the operation of MTR has a 
positive impact on franchised bus service efficiency is fully supported by 
empirical evidence. To begin with, Table 1 showing the pooled data from 
four companies reveals that the coefficient of the dummy variable M is 
negative 2.72 and significant.  
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In addition, the individual tests for KMB and CMB also yield the 
same result with the coefficient being negative 1.49 and 2.03 respectively. 
Both of the results are considered significant as shown in Table 2 and 
Table 3 respectively. It is worth mentioning that even test using data 
deflated by CPI instead of the GDP deflator yield similar results. They 
are shown in Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 respectively.  
 
An intuition about the results is quite obvious. The Mass Transit 
Railway is a major competitor with the franchised bus service. This result 
also leads support to the argument presented previously in the historical 
review. There are thus reasons to believe that although three companies 
out of four are subject to economies of scale, the introduction of an 
external competitor can do more good than harm. In other words, a 
competitive business environment is of great value to enhance market 
efficiency. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter includes two components. Firstly, it summarizes the 
ideas and empirical findings of previous chapters. The interpretation of 
these empirical findings then leads to the identification of the limitations 
of this dissertation and possible directions for future research. 
 
Summary of Key Points 
This dissertation applies the ideas in “The Federal 
Communications Commission” (Coase, 1959) to study the government 
franchise to bus transit services in Hong Kong. The history of the bus 
franchise in Hong Kong is also reviewed so as to provide a clearer 
context for the research. In order to examine the market efficiency of the 
franchised bus transit services, three empirical hypotheses in light of the 
historical development are designed. They are regarding the involvement 
of property developers, the question of economies of scale, and finally the 
impacts of the MTR. The methodology used to test these three empirical 
hypotheses is learned from literature on the ownership structure of bus 
services and their impact on services efficiency.  
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“Coase was actually more Pigovian than Coasian” (Lai, 2007: 
363).  The ideas in “The Federal Communications Commission” (Coase, 
1959) indeed justified the initiative of government franchise, provided 
that there are free reallocations of rights to the public bus transit services 
later on.  
 
Who owns the public roads in the first place do not affect market 
efficiency provided that there can be a free pricing mechanism to 
reallocate these rights. In other words, the minimum government 
intervention is preferable after private companies initially obtained the 
rights to use the public roads in terms of providing bus transit services to 
the public.  
 
Discussion 
 
The empirical findings have two lessons: (a) market efficiency 
can be improved by monopoly power; and (b) market efficiency can be 
increased with growing competition, in this dissertation the competition 
from the MTR. Monopoly power contributes to market efficiency when 
the company is subject to economies of scale. At the same time, 
introducing competition in the form of a substitute can improve the 
service efficiency. The policy implication for government is that in order 
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to ensure transportation efficiency, it is not necessary to create another 
franchise. Introducing a good railway system can achieve the same result.  
 
The impact of the involvement of a property developer on a bus 
company is ambiguous. According to theoretical arguments, a higher 
level of private sector involvement in a bus company should improve the 
service efficiency. However, the Hong Kong empirical data are showing 
quite the opposite results. 
 
Limitations and Further Study 
 
The major limitation of this dissertation, given the author’s time 
constraints, is one of data limitation. For one thing, bus fare is used as an 
indicator of the unit cost of different companies, i.e., the cost per 
kilometer. However, this indicator is not as accurate as the exact profit 
margins, which are unfortunately unknown. This inaccuracy may have 
directly caused the disappointing results of the tests. Besides, the cost 
function adopted in the model cannot take into account the effects of 
network of different bus companies, for example, different number of 
routes, different number of stops per route, and service location which 
often affect evaluation of economies of scale.  
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Therefore, any future study should be based on data that capture 
the unit costs more accurately. At the same time, the cost function can 
also be refined to take network effects into consideration. These include 
the numbers of routes; different number of stops per route and service 
location of different bus companies. 
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APPENDICES 
1. KMB Operation Data 
Year 
Total 
No. of 
Routes 
Total No. of 
Registered 
Buses 
Passenger Carried 
(Persons in million)
Journey Covered by 
the Whole Fleet 
(in million 
kilometers) 
Fares6 
(Hong Kong 
Dollar at 2006 
price level) 
1961 55 721 437 35 1.60 
1962 59 777 483 38.8 1.56 
1963 62 866 514 39.6 1.50 
1964 64 946 547 40.3 1.43 
1965 64 1004 593 45.7 1.40 
1966 65 1055 643 47.2 1.39 
1970 70 1018 568 40.4 1.09 
1972 84 1272 502 44.4 0.93 
1973 92 1324 490 46.1 0.82 
1974 106 1371 565 54.9 0.73 
1975 137 1560 621 63 3.95 
1976 150 1700 754 70 3.62 
1977 159 1708 810 73.3 3.48 
1978 178 1804 860 73.1 3.22 
1979 194 1867 934 113 2.74 
1980 192 2089 912 122 7.40 
1981 192 2390 933 134 5.70 
1982 192 2369 940 140 3.46 
1983 177 2380 982 160 4.53 
1984 178 2441 1069 170 4.12 
1985 187 2511 1079 188 4.48 
1986 213 2740 1108 210 4.32 
1987 220 2900 1088 220 4.40 
1990 261 2887 966 195.3 8.45 
1991 251 3037 968 217 9.62 
1992 268 3121 970 234 8.28 
1993 301 3197 966 243 13.02 
1994 306 3369 977 255 14.30 
1995 302 3507 993 271 13.99 
1997 307 3839 1051 285 13.12 
1998 334 3991 1030 329 15.42 
1999 334 4064 1100 344 16.13 
2000 332 4238 1080 329 16.75 
                                                            
 
6 It is the mid point of the maximum fare and minimum fare and deflated by GDP 
deflator. (2006=100) 
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(Con’t) 
Year 
Total 
No. of 
Routes 
Total No. of 
Registered 
Buses 
Passenger Carried 
(Persons in million)
Journey Covered by 
the Whole Fleet 
(in million 
kilometers) 
Fares7 
(Hong Kong 
Dollar at 2006 
price level) 
2001 337 4371 1110 349 17.07 
2002 337 4430 1130 349.9 17.67 
2003 404 4284 1060 344.3 18.85 
2004 398 4141 1060 342.8 19.72 
2005 395 4021 1010 339 19.74 
2006 395 4013 1010 336 19.80 
2007 393 4027 1010 331 19.24 
                                                            
 
7 It is the mid point of the maximum fare and minimum fare and deflated by GDP 
deflator. (2006=100) 
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2. CMB Operation Data 
Year 
Total 
No. of 
Routes 
Total No. of 
Registered 
Buses 
Passenger Carried 
(Persons in million)
Journey Covered 
by the Whole Fleet 
(in million 
kilometers) 
Fares8 
(Hong Kong 
Dollar at 2006 
price level) 
1961 21 307 120 12 1.60 
1962 21 325 134 13.5 1.56 
1963 28 360 143 14.2 1.50 
1964 31 394 159 15.3 1.43 
1965 31 459 169 16.6 1.40 
1966 31 498 187 18.7 1.39 
1970 29 499 186 17.2 1.09 
1971 29 483 175 15.3 1.02 
1973 39 565 181 15.5 0.82 
1974 47 595 216 19.7 0.73 
1975 57 629 230 22.8 3.02 
1976 66 702 240 26.4 2.77 
1980 99 985 287 42 2.79 
1981 86 1028 312 43 3.29 
1982 92 1047 348 45 5.31 
1983 80 1090 363 52 5.08 
1984 84 1076 344 55 3.32 
1985 80 1054 318 55 3.15 
1986 96 1019 318 55 4.14 
1987 96 925 318 56 3.81 
1990 87 1026 267 51.7 5.25 
1991 94 1020 262 52 9.74 
1992 97 1027 236 52 8.87 
1993 91 1014 197 48 13.41 
1994 93 961 191 44 14.71 
1995 86 883 179 44.3 14.13 
1997 85 746 176 44.5 13.56 
1998 44 718 105 30.3 14.40 
 
                                                            
 
8 It is the mid point of the maximum fare and minimum fare and deflated by GDP 
deflator. (2006=100) 
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3. CTB Operation Data 
Year 
Total 
No. of 
Routes 
Total No. of 
Registered 
Buses 
Passenger Carried 
(Persons in million)
Journey Covered 
by the Whole 
Fleet 
(in million 
kilometers) 
Fares9 
(Hong Kong 
Dollar at 2006 
price level) 
1993 24 200 22 3.6 6.78 
1994 35 144 68 12 6.92 
1995 47 338 88 17.1 7.75 
1997 48 375 120 25 13.56 
1998 86 955 183 65 18.88 
2001 89 957 216 82 20.69 
2002 90 956 220.4 83.7 21.42 
2003 90 940 207.3 82.8 22.84 
2004 89 911 210.8 84.2 23.66 
2005 89 910 205.8 82.3 23.68 
2006 88 909 207.8 82.4 25.25 
2007 90 919 210.4 82.5 24.54 
 
                                                            
 
9 It is the mid point of the maximum fare and minimum fare and deflated by GDP 
deflator. (2006=100) 
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4. NWFB Operation Data 
 
                                                            
 
10 It is the mid point of the maximum fare and minimum fare and deflated by GDP 
deflator. (2006=100) 
Year 
Total 
No. of 
Routes 
Total No. of 
Registered 
Buses 
Passenger Carried 
(Persons in million)
Journey Covered by 
the Whole Fleet 
(in million 
kilometers) 
Fares10 
(Hong Kong 
Dollar at 
2006 price 
level) 
1998 63 841 47 13.8 14.52 
2000 65 730 187 55.5 15.64 
2001 61 757 194.5 56.7 16.20 
2002 62 769 195.5 60.9 16.77 
2003 73 730 180.5 59.4 17.88 
2004 69 695 184.6 56.4 18.53 
2005 66 694 177.5 52.1 18.54 
2006 65 694 183.1 50.9 18.60 
2007 65 694 184.4 50.4 18.08 
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5. GDP Deflator and CPI Source11 
                                                            
 
11 Source: Census and Statistics Department, the Government of the Hong Kong SAR 
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